FORTIS NOVUM MUNDUM / VOLUME I — DOCTRINE

A Manual for Military Operations on Urban Terrain

THE CITY IS NOT A SURFACE.
IT IS A LAYERED BATTLESPACE.

A doctrinal framework for understanding conflict across streets, structures, subterranean networks, and the invisible dimensions of modern warfare.

FM—UT 4—1
The Four-Floor War book cover — a manual for military operations on urban terrain by Josh Luberisse
JOSH LUBERISSE19 CHAPTERS / 4 PARTS

THE FAILURE
OF FLAT WAR.

Contemporary military doctrine is not fully aligned with the environment in which modern urban conflict unfolds. Planning frameworks continue to rely heavily on two-dimensional representations of terrain, while actual operations extend through interconnected physical structures and non-physical domains.

The argument is not that urban doctrine does not exist. It is that integration remains the defining institutional challenge.

“The city is not a surface.
It is a volume.”
FIG. ASURFACE MODEL
BLOCK 01BLOCK 07BLOCK 14
Area is visible. Structure, elevation, and interconnection disappear.
FIG. BVOLUMETRIC MODEL
The same district understood as stacked, connected operational space.

ONE CITY.
MULTIPLE LAYERS.
ONE OPERATIONAL REALITY.

Select a physical level. Then introduce the invisible dimensions. The operational picture changes not because the city moves, but because more of its relationships become visible.

PHYSICAL LEVELS
ARCHITECTURAL SECTION / CONCEPTUALLEVEL 01 ACTIVE
+ 01+ 02± 03− 04
01 / ROOFTOP

High-rise rooftops, antennas, civilian and military observation, low-altitude airspace, and surveillance infrastructure form the city’s exposed upper edge.

Elevation changes what can be seen—and what can be hidden.
THE INVISIBLE LAYERS00 ON

Functional dimensions, not additional floors. Combine them with the physical city.

No conceptual overlays active. The visible city is only the beginning.

Physical terrain and non-physical dimensions interact continuously. Understanding one without the others produces an incomplete operational picture.

URBAN WARFARE IS NOT SIMPLY MORE DIFFICULT.

IT IS STRUCTURALLY
DIFFERENT.

I

Inevitability

The concentration of population, infrastructure, governance, and strategic objectives within urban environments makes urban operations an enduring military requirement.

II

Complexity

Dense construction, civilian presence, verticality, underground infrastructure, and information saturation create interacting challenges—not ordinary terrain constraints.

III

Scale

The operational challenges of a megacity differ fundamentally from smaller urban engagements. Increasing the size of conventional formations does not automatically resolve the problem.

IV

Integration

Physical control is only part of the urban problem. Intelligence, communications, information, human judgment, and sustainment collectively shape operational outcomes.

ANATOMY OF THE
FOUR-FLOOR WAR.

19CHAPTERS
FOUR PARTS
ONE FRAMEWORK
PART I

The problem, the environment, the framework

Establishes the contemporary urban warfare problem, the nature of the environment, and the legal and ethical framework governing military action.

  1. 01

    Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century

    Why urban combat is the baseline condition of modern warfare, and where doctrinal consensus still falls short.

  2. 02

    The Urban Operational Environment

    Density, verticality, subterranean extension, civilian presence, and the city as an active operational system.

  3. 03

    Legal and Ethical Frameworks for Urban Operations

    Distinction, proportionality, responsibility, and lawful decision-making under urban compression.

A reference work designed for consultation, sequential reading, and professional study.

Get the complete manual
PROLOGUE / 001
The Four-Floor War book cover — a manual for military operations on urban terrain by Josh Luberisse
THE FAILURE OF FLAT WAR

“Modern military forces enter cities with conceptual models designed for terrain that no longer exists.”

THE CITY IS NOT A SURFACE.
IT IS A VOLUME.

The geometry of the fight is not linear. It is stacked, compartmentalized, and internally connected in ways that render surface-based representations insufficient.

THE BATTLESPACE
HAS ALREADY CHANGED.

Recent conflicts do not provide a single template for the future. They reveal a recurring condition: the city as an integrated physical, human, and informational system.

01

Mosul

Dense construction, subterranean movement, civilian presence, and the scale of clearance exposed the limits of surface-based models.

URBAN / OBSERVED
02

Marawi

A prolonged urban engagement demonstrated how structures, endurance, information, and force protection interact.

URBAN / OBSERVED
03

Mariupol

High-intensity combat made the city simultaneously a physical, informational, electromagnetic, and human battlespace.

URBAN / OBSERVED
04

Bakhmut

Attrition, observation, fires, and decision compression reshaped the operational meaning of terrain.

URBAN / OBSERVED

Historical analysis, not classified intelligence. No gruesome imagery. No fabricated certainty.

ONE BATTLESPACE.
TWO COMPLEMENTARY WORKS.

The first volume establishes the conceptual framework. The second addresses its tactical application.

The Four-Floor War book cover — a manual for military operations on urban terrain by Josh Luberisse
VOLUME I — DOCTRINE

The Four-Floor War

A Manual for Military Operations on Urban Terrain

The conceptual and institutional framework for commanders, planners, military educators, defense analysts, and researchers.

Streets, Sewers, and Skylines book cover by Josh Luberisse
VOLUME II — TACTICAL APPLICATION

Streets, Sewers, and Skylines

A Tactical Manual for Urban Combat Operations

A practitioner-oriented companion examining small-unit urban combat problems across surface, subterranean, and vertical terrain.

WRITTEN FOR THOSE WHO STUDY, PLAN, AND UNDERSTAND MODERN CONFLICT.

A professional reference on the relationships between doctrine, terrain, technology, command, sustainment, and institutional adaptation.

  • Military officers and noncommissioned officers
  • Defense planners and strategic analysts
  • Intelligence professionals
  • Professional military educators
  • Defense researchers and scholars
  • Students of contemporary warfare

INDEPENDENT PUBLICATIONThis is an independently published work of military analysis. It is not an official Department of Defense field manual and is not endorsed by any armed service or government agency.

JOSH
LUBERISSE

Josh Luberisse is a writer and researcher working across modern warfare, national security, asymmetric conflict, military doctrine, and emerging technologies.

His related publications include Asymmetric Warfare: Strategies and Tactics for the Modern Combatant and A Boydian Approach to Mastering Unconventional Warfare.

Fortis Novum Mundum
FM—UT 4—1 / VOLUME I
The Four-Floor War book cover — a manual for military operations on urban terrain by Josh Luberisse
FORTIS NOVUM MUNDUM

THE
FOUR-FLOOR
WAR

A Manual for Military Operations on Urban Terrain

JOSH LUBERISSE

Nineteen chapters. Four parts. A doctrinal framework for the layered city and the integrated realities of modern urban warfare.

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QUESTIONS FROM STUDENTS
OF THE LAYERED CITY.

Direct answers about the framework, the intended audience, and how the manual relates to official urban operations doctrine.

THE FOUR-FLOOR WAR / VOLUME I

THE FUTURE OF WAR
WILL NOT BE FOUGHT
ON A FLAT MAP.

The Four-Floor War establishes a framework for understanding military operations in a world where the city is no longer merely terrain, but an interconnected operational system.

GET THE BOOKAMAZON
THE FOUR-FLOOR WAR / PROLOGUEEXCERPT 001

THE FAILURE OF FLAT WAR

The city is not a surface.
It is a volume.

Modern military forces enter cities with conceptual models designed for terrain that no longer exists. The dominant mental model of ground combat remains fundamentally two-dimensional. It assumes that terrain can be understood as a surface across which forces maneuver, that engagements occur along identifiable frontages, and that control can be achieved through the sequential application of fires and movement across that surface.

Urban environments invalidate this model at every level.

The city is not a surface. It is a volume.

Combat in urban terrain does not occur across a plane. It occurs simultaneously above, within, and below the structures that define the environment. It unfolds across multiple vertical strata, within enclosed spaces that fragment observation and isolate maneuver, and through subterranean networks that connect distant points without reference to the visible terrain.

The contemporary urban battlespace is therefore not merely complex. It is integrated. This integration is not optional. It is imposed by the environment.

JOSH LUBERISSEFORTIS NOVUM MUNDUM